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Donation calls in which the potential donors are asked how many units of a
charitable good they wish to fund are a frequently used solicitation scheme
among fundraising practitioners. A prominent example that has attracted about
one million donors from all over the world is ShareTheMeal, a smartphone app
and initiative of the United Nations World Food Programme which is used to
provide food to children in need. Donors for ShareTheMeal are informed that
feeding one child for a day costs e 0.70 and are then asked to indicate the number
of feeding days (“meals”) that they would like to fund (“share”). Over 88 million
meals have been provided through the organization’s app so far. Unit donation
schemes are not only implemented in food programs. Development aid agencies,
for example, promote child sponsorships by fixing the monthly donation for the
sponsorship – usually around $35 – and prospective donors choose the number of
child-months to sponsor rather than the amount of money to donate. UNICEF
Canada goes beyond this and provides a whole online shop for specific charitable
goods, such as a set of measles vaccines for $16, a teacher training for $114, or a
water pump for $492. Similarly, fundraising drives for biodiversity conservation
or reforestation programs let donors indicate the number of acres or trees to
fund. For instance, in the Monarch Butterfly Habitat Exchange program of the
Environmental Defense Fund, donors sponsored acres of milkweed habitat for
$35 per acre. In the Plant A Tree program of the Jewish National Fund, donors
were asked to choose the number of trees to be planted at $18 a tree.
The prevalence of such schemes in fundraising must reflect a belief among
practitioners that they can outperform alternative schemes in particular circum-
stances. This difference in expected performance needs to outweigh the need for
the charity to make more information available to the donor and the restriction
on how the raised funds can be used. The belief in better performance may well
be justified: Research has shown that seemingly small changes in the choice ar-
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chitecture of a decision problem can lead to substantial changes in donor behav-
ior. Examples are the announcement of seed money (List and Lucking-Reiley,
2002; Huck et al., 2015), specifying default amounts (Goswami and Urminsky,
2016; Altmann et al., 2019), suggesting donation levels (Edwards and List, 2014;
Reiley and Samek, 2019), and providing information about the efficacy of the
donation (Latour and Manrai, 1989; Cryder et al., 2013). However, to the best
of our knowledge, no previous study has systematically compared a solicitation
scheme in which the charity asks potential donors to fund units – which we refer
to as a “unit donation” scheme – to the traditional scheme of “simply asking
for money” (Landry et al., 2010) – which we refer to as a “money donation”
scheme.
This paper seeks to close this gap in the literature by comparing both schemes
under controlled conditions in an online donation experiment with real money at
stake. In their purest forms, the two schemes differ along three dimensions: Unit
donation schemes (i) frame the choice in terms of physical units of the charitable
good instead of money, (ii) restrict the choice to complete units (i.e. the donation
to multiples of the price per unit), and (iii) provide information about the
effectiveness of a donation (i.e. the price per unit). The restriction to complete
units reflects that some charitable goods are indivisible as a matter of nature
(planting half a tree or donating half a coat) or of choice (offering half a meal).
Stating the price per unit is necessary for the potential donor to calculate her
expenses. Our experimental variations reflect these three dimensions: Subjects
in the money donation treatment are simply asked how much money they would
like to donate for the provision of food to malnourished children. Subjects in the
unit donation treatments are asked how many nutritional rations they would
like to fund at a given price, without the possibility to fund fractions. We
compare two different unit sizes: A smaller sized unit of the ration that feeds
one child for one day (price of $0.50) and a larger sized unit that feeds one child
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for one week (price of $3.50). In addition to these pure implementations of the
money and unit donation schemes, we implement three intermediate forms that
selectively activate one or two of the three dimensions that distinguish the two
schemes.
Our experiment delivers three main findings. The first is that the money and
unit donation schemes were, on average, equally effective in raising donations:
There is no statistically significant difference in average donations between the
two schemes. This is surprising in light of the higher demands that the unit
donation scheme places on the charity. If our results hold more generally, this
means that practitioners of unit donation schemes either hold erroneous beliefs
about their fundraising effectiveness or use it to pursue other objectives than
maximizing the size of the average donation.
Our second finding highlights a plausible alternative objective implicit in unit
donation schemes. In our experiment, the unit donation scheme increased the
propensity to become a donor when the unit size was small: For the one-day
ration at a price of $0.5, the share of donors was about 13 percentage points
higher than for the baseline money donation scheme. This is a statistically and
quantitatively significant increase in the propensity to give. An appropriately
designed unit donation scheme has therefore the potential to recruit more donors
than a money donation scheme. Such a recruitment is likely to be valuable
to fundraisers in its own right: Previous research has shown that it is easier
to reactivate prior or lapsed donors compared to “cold calling” an unselected
sample (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Landry et al., 2010). Unit donation schemes
therefore have a plausible role in growing a charity’s donor base.
Our third finding is that unit size matters: In our experiment, the larger-
sized unit (one-week ration at $3.50) reduced the propensity to become a donor
by 22 percentage points compared to the pure money donation scheme, a statis-
tically and quantitatively significant amount. Larger unit-sizes therefore deter
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donors at the extensive margin. Our intermediate treatments indicate that this
decrease can be traced back to discretizing the donation choice rather than to
framing donations in units or to informing about the effectiveness of a donation.
In lights of these results, we conclude with the hypothesis that unit donation
schemes with small unit sizes decrease a possible stigma associated with “penny
donations” or similarly small donation sizes.
2 Related literature
By providing a controlled comparison between unit and money donation schemes,
we contribute to a rich literature that investigates how the design of the ask
affects giving. Examples include the provision of seed money (List and Lucking-
Reiley, 2002; Huck et al., 2015), specifying default amounts (Goswami and Ur-
minsky, 2016; Altmann et al., 2019; Ghesla et al., 2019), or offering subsidies to
give (Auten et al., 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Karlan and List, 2007; see
Epperson and Reif, 2019, for a review). Although several papers have used unit
instead of money donation schemes as part of their experimental designs, we are
not aware of any systematic comparison between the two solicitation schemes.
Unit donations have been applied, for example, in experiments on the volun-
tary provision of climate change mitigation (Loeschel et al., 2013; Kesternich
et al., 2016; Diederich and Goeschl, 2014, 2017, 2018). Furthermore, Diederich
et al. (2020) show that a reliable finding of the literature on charitable giving
– i.e. that matching subsidies raise more money than rebate subsidies – is not
replicated under a unit donation scheme.
Due to the three main characteristics of a unit donation scheme, our paper
relates to different strands of the literature. First, unit donation schemes im-
plement a different framing of the ask: Potential donors are asked how many
units of a charitable good to fund rather than the amount of money to give.
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While the effects of framing have been investigated in various domains, includ-
ing contributions to public goods (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998) and
charitable giving (Chou and Murnighan, 2013; Grossman and Eckel, 2015), we
are not aware of a comparison between money and unit framing for contribution
decisions. Lewis and Small (2019) show that presenting the impact of a dona-
tion as units of a charitable good per dollar instead of dollar costs per unit of
the charitable good significantly affects the response to changes in the effective-
ness of the donation. However, the donation question is still framed in terms of
money, rather than in physical units of the charitable good. By asking for the
number of units of the charitable good, unit donation schemes may emphasize
how a donation generates specific outcomes for recipients. As a result, impact
motives of giving (Duncan, 2004; Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2018) might
become more relevant in the donation decision.
Second, unit donation schemes restrict the choice set of subjects to amounts
that correspond to multiples of the unit price. Featuring a discrete choice set
is not unusual in studies on charitable giving (e.g. Meier, 2007; Gneezy et al.,
2014), but the effect of implementing a restricted instead of an unrestricted
choice set are not well understood. Cartwright and Mirza (2019) shows that in-
troducing a minimum donation amount reduces giving if there are no extrinsic
incentives to donate. Other studies consider the effect of restricting donors’
choices in the context of threshold public goods (e.g. Cadsby and Maynes,
1999; Barbieri and Malueg, 2014). Somewhat related are also studies that find
that suggested donation amounts (Weyant and Smith, 1987; Fraser et al., 1988;
Adena et al., 2014; Edwards and List, 2014; Reiley and Samek, 2019) or default
donations (Goswami and Urminsky, 2016; Altmann et al., 2019; Ghesla et al.,
2019) can have a substantial impact on giving.
Third, we add to the literature on providing donors with additional informa-
tion. In contrast to money donation schemes, unit donation calls must provide
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information about the price of a charitable good, i.e. the effectiveness of a mon-
etary donation. Otherwise, potential donors would not be able to calculate the
monetary donation that their chosen number of units implies. Several studies
have examined whether information about the effectiveness of donations affects
giving. For example, Latour and Manrai (1989) complement a blood donation
campaign with a letter informing how blood donations saved a child’s life and
find substantial increases in donations. Along the same lines, Cryder et al.
(2013) find that providing subjects with “tangible information” about the im-
pact of the donation, either in the form of details of the charity’s activities or
about the exact charitable good it provides, increases donations. The authors
conclude that the observed effect of tangible information is not only mediated
by sympathy but also by an increase in the perceived impact of the donation.
In contrast, Karlan and Wood (2017) do not find a significant effect of provid-
ing information about the impact of a donation on the aggregate, but identify
heterogeneous treatment effects by whether a donor has previously given a large
or small amount of money.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Donation appeal
The experiment consisted of a real donation ask administered to subjects during
an unrelated online survey. Designing the ask as a pure money donation scheme,
a pure unit donation scheme, and various intermediate schemes, requires a char-
itable good or service readily divisible into discrete and meaningful units. We
partenered with a relief organization, Sign of Hope e.V., which frequently uses
intermediate schemes of unit donation calls in their own fundraising campaigns.
Among their activities, we chose the treatment of malnourished children with a
special nutritional paste and high energy cookies in a bush clinic in South Su-
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dan. This service offered practicable units and prices for our experiment. The
associated expenses amounted to $0.50 per day or $3.50 per week. These bench-
marks provided the two different unit sizes for the experiment: (i) a one-week
nutritional ration per child at a price of $3.50 and (ii) a one-day nutritional
ration per child at a price of $0.50.
The first part of the donation appeal in the experiment was uniform across
all treatments. It introduced the charity, the charitable good (treatment of
malnourished children with special nutrition in a hospital in South Sudan), and
the charitable cause (a high need due to decades of civil war in the country and
hence, a high incidence of malnourishment).1
The second part of the donation appeal was treatment specific. The six ex-
perimental treatments (see Table 1) were designed to (i) compare contributions
under the unit and money donation scheme, (ii) investigate whether the size of
a unit matters for this comparison and (iii) disentangle the channels through
which differences may arise. The three treatments of type A (“pure schemes”)
address aspects (i) and (ii). They consist of a treatment with a pure money do-
nation scheme, in which subjects are simply asked how much money they would
like to give, and two treatments with a pure unit donation scheme. In the latter,
subjects were asked how many rations they would like to fund (one-week and
one-day rations, respectively), had their choice restricted to whole units, and
learned the price of a unit ($3.50 and $0.50, respectively). Subjects entered
their desired amount of money or number of nutritional rations in an input field
at the bottom of the solicitation screen. We provide the exact wording of the
donation appeal for each treatment in the Appendix.
The three treatments of type B (“intermediate schemes”) address aspect (iii).
They include a strict subset of the three characteristics that jointly make up
a unit donation scheme (unit framing, restricted choice set, price information).
1We also provided a link to the charity’s web page and informed about a transparency
certificate the charity holds to increase trust in the charity (Adena et al., 2019).
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This allows us to identify the channels through which potential differences in
giving behavior between the pure schemes arise. Specifically, we conduct an un-
restricted money donation scheme that provides unit price information (Info),
a money donation scheme restricted to multiples of a disclosed unit price (Info
+ Restricted), and a unit donation scheme with perfectly divisible units (Info
+ Frame). The three intermediate schemes are implemented only for the case
of the one-week ration because we expect larger treatment effects for the larger-
sized unit. The three intermediate schemes deliberately leave out three addi-
tional possible combinations of the three characteristics because they do not
have a meaningful real-world counterpart. There are, for obvious reasons, no
schemes that ask for units to fund without also informing the donor about
the unit price; and schemes do not arbitrarily restrict the choices of monetary
amounts to multiples of some unit price unless information on the unit price is
given.2
Table 1: Treatments
Treatment Framing Choice set Price info Unit size
A. Pure schemes
Money Donation Money Unrestricted No —
Unit Donation – Large Units Restricted Yes Large
Unit Donation – Small Units Restricted Yes Small
B. Intermediate schemes
Info Money Unrestricted Yes Large
Info + Frame Units Unrestricted Yes Large
Info + Restricted Money Restricted Yes Large
The table provides an overview of the different treatments in our experiment. Framing: whether the
ask is framed in terms of money or physical units. Choice set: whether the choice set is restricted
to complete units of the charitable good (multiples of the unit price when the donation is framed
in money). Price info: whether information about the unit price of the charitable good is provided.
Unit size: Whether one physical unit is a one-day ration of food (small) or a one-week ration of food
(large).
2To illustrate, imagine a donor who decides how much money to give. If the donor is
informed that for $3.50 the charity can provide a nutritional ration that feeds one child for
one week, a restriction of donations to multiples of $3.50 will most likely seem reasonable to
the donor. However, if this information is not given such a restriction will probably appear
arbitrary to the donor.
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3.2 Experimental protocol
We conducted the experiment online recruiting U.S. residents from the online la-
bor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).3 In the posted task, we informed
workers that they would earn $7 for answering a 20-minute academic survey
on several topics, including demographics, occupational background, religion,
and opinions about some political and societal challenges. Interested workers
followed a link to the survey on LimeSurvey. Before the start of the survey,
workers read and confirmed a consent form about the research study.
The experimental survey consisted of 22 questions on sociodemographics,
employment, religious beliefs, and political attitude before subjects encountered
the donation ask, and 12 unrelated questions after the call. One of the treat-
ments was drawn at random and presented to the subject (between-subjects
design). The survey ended with five manipulation check questions. After com-
pleting the survey, subjects received a unique code that had to be entered into
the survey task window on AMT for payment.
In total, 900 subjects completed the survey experiment. We chose the sample
size to be able to pick up significant differences in mean donations starting at
about 5% of the endowment, according to power calculations based on data
from a pilot experiment (80% power and 5% significance level). The concern
that some subjects may fraudulently use multiple accounts to participate more
than once is generally seen as a minor problem in online experiments (Horton
et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010).4 We nevertheless follow the common approach
3AMT is known to provide several benefits to researchers, among them fast and easy
access to subjects, a diverse subject pool, and low costs (Paolacci et al., 2010; Mason and
Suri, 2012). Regarding data quality, several papers highlight a high internal consistency
of self-reported demographics, an incentive-compatibility of earnings, and a “spammer”-free
workforce from the built-in reputation system (Ross et al., 2010; Mason and Suri, 2012). They
also provide evidence that results from standard experimental games successfully replicate on
AMT (e.g. Paolacci et al., 2010; Rand, 2012). In implementing our experiment, we followed
the suggestions for researchers in that literature and the Guidelines for Academic Requesters
on AMT (WeAreDynamo, 2014).
4In the case of AMT, having multiple accounts is forbidden by Amazon’s Terms of Ser-
vice (Mason and Suri, 2012) and creating an account requires a unique credit card number
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to exclude subjects with duplicate Internet Protocol addresses from the analysis.
Including them does not change the results. This leaves us with a sample of
848 subjects. Average payouts were $5.87 excluding donations. Subjects took
on average 10.1 minutes to complete the experiment.
4 Results
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the sample that participated in our exper-
iment. Our average subject is slightly more likely to be female than male, has
an average age of 37.1 years, and has children and a college degree with a prob-
ability of 46% and 49%, respectively. About 25% of subjects state that online
crowdworking is their primary source of income. To check the balance of these
sociodemgraphic variables across the experimental groups, we regress each vari-
able on treatment dummies and conduct F -tests for the joint significance of the
coefficients. The corresponding p-values are reported together with the group
means in Appendix Table A.1. The test results suggest that the randomization
led to experimental groups that are balanced on all sociodemgraphic variables
(p-values between 0.25 and 0.93).
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD N
Female 0.54 0.50 842
Age (years) 37.11 10.59 847
Has children 0.46 0.50 844
College graduate 0.49 0.50 845
Crowdworker 0.25 0.43 834
The total sample consists of 848 observations. We did not
force subjects to answer the sociodemographic questions in the
survey. The variable crowdworker indicates whether online
crowdworking is the subject’s primary source of income.
Table 3 reports the share of donors and the mean donation (including non-
donors) in each of the six treatment groups. For the treatments with unit
(Paolacci et al., 2010).
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framing, the mean dollar donation corresponds to the average number of nutri-
tional rations donated times the unit price. Mean donations vary between $0.95
for the money donation scheme and $1.34 for the money donation with unit cost
information and a restricted choice set. The variance within each treatment is
considerable and donations range from the lower limit of $0.00 (no donation)
to the the upper limit of $7.00. The share of donors varies between 26% for the
large-sized and 60% for the small-sized unit donation scheme. The benchmark
of the standard money donation is at 47%. These descriptive statistics point to
possibly significant extensive-margin effects across solicitation schemes.
Table 3: Donations
Treatment Share of donors Mean donation N
A. Pure schemes
Money Donation 0.47 (0.50) 0.95 (1.53) 152
Unit Donation - Large (p = $3.50) 0.26 (0.44) 1.16 (2.14) 121
Unit Donation - Small (p = $0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 1.07 (1.62) 146
B. Intermediate schemes
Info (p = $3.50) 0.43 (0.50) 1.12 (1.86) 150
Info + Unit frame (p = $3.50) 0.38 (0.49) 1.15 (2.06) 132
Info + Restricted (p = $3.50) 0.27 (0.44) 1.34 (2.10) 146
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Figure 1 presents the cumulative distribution of donations for the three pure
scheme treatments. The solid black line refers to the 152 donation decisions
under the standard money donation scheme. As reported in Table 3, we see
that slightly more than half of the subjects chose not to donate to the charity.
For positive donations, there are clear focal points of contributions at full dollar
amounts and, less pronounced, at half dollars. In other words, donors do not
make use of the unrestricted nature of the donation space, with some excep-
tions between $0.00 and $1.00. Unsurprisingly, lower money donations are more
frequently observed than higher ones.
The dashed blue line shows the cumulative distribution of 121 donation deci-
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of donations in the pure scheme treatments
donation levels under this scheme: No donation ($0.00), one week of nutrition
($3.50), or two weeks of nutrition ($7.00). 74% of subjects chose not to do-
nate under this scheme while 18% chose to provide one week of nutrition and
about 7% to provide two weeks. The dashed orange line presents the cumula-
tive distribution of 146 donation decisions under the small-sized unit donation
scheme. There are fifteen possible donation levels for subjects, ranging from
zero to fourteen days of nutrition. Here, around 40% of subjects chose not to
donate. For positive donations, slightly more than 16% chose to provide a single
day of nutrition at a cost of $0.50 and almost 23% chose two days. More days
of nutrition are less common and their relative frequency under the small-sized
unit donation scheme visually does not differ much from that under the money
donation scheme.
We proceed in Section 4.1 by first comparing the mean donations (includ-
ing non-donors) across treatments. Afterwards, we investigate the behavior of
potential donors at the extensive margin (Section 4.2).
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Table 4: Effect on donations (OLS regression)
Pure schemes Pure and intermediate schemes
with large unit size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unit Donation – Large 0.202 0.217 – – – –
(0.231) (0.232)
Unit Donation – Small 0.110 0.104 – – – –
(0.183) (0.182)
Price information – – 0.216 0.237 0.167 0.180
(0.185) (0.186) (0.196) (0.197)
Unit frame – – 0.117 0.149 0.221 0.270
(0.175) (0.177) (0.237) (0.239)
Restricted choice set – – -0.070 -0.111 0.029 0.005
(0.174) (0.176) (0.228) (0.232)
Unit frame × restricted – – – – -0.215 -0.251
(0.351) (0.357)
Controlsa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 419 408 701 686 701 686
R2 0.002 0.032 0.004 0.018 0.004 0.019
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the amount of money the charity receives and the pure money donation scheme always
serves as baseline. In columns 1 and 2, only the treatements with pure solicitation schemes are
considered. In columns 3 to 6, all treatments except the unit donation scheme with a small unit
size are considered.
aControls include gender, age, whether the individual has a college degree, whether the individual
has children and whether online crowdworking is the individual’s primary source of income.
4.1 Donations
We observed in Table 3 that the differences in the mean donations between
treatments are small (at most 5.6% of the endowment of $7) and that the
within-treatment variances are high. More specifically, the differences between
the pure money and pure unit donation treatments amount to $0.21 for the one-
week and to $0.12 for the one-day rations. Both differences are insignificant in
a two-sided t-test (p = 0.380 and p = 0.546, respectively).
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we report estimation results from regressing
the monetary amount donated on the treatment dummies, using the pure money
donation scheme as baseline and only considering the pure solicitation schemes.
Even after controlling for available covariates, the differences between the pure
solicitation schemes remain very small and insignificant (see column 2). Thus,
we do not find evidence that applying a unit donation scheme instead of a money
donation scheme significantly affects the average amount of money received,
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irrespective of whether a small or large unit size is employed.
For the large unit size, we use our intermediate treatments to identify how
specific characteristics of a unit donation scheme affect giving. In particular, we
regress individuals’ donations on a dummy for each of the three characteristics
of a unit donation scheme (price information, unit framing, and a restricted
choice set). This allows us to test whether the insignificant difference between
the unit and money donation scheme masks countervailing effects of single char-
acteristics. The estimation results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.
We do not find any evidence for such countervailing effects: All coefficients are
small and insignificantly different from zero. The same holds true if we addi-
tionally include the interaction of using a unit frame and restricting the choice
set (see columns 5 and 6), which can be identified due to the selection of our
intermediate treatments.
4.2 Propensity to give
As already noted, the differences at the extensive margin merit attention. While
in the pure money scheme, about 47% of subjects donate, only about 26% of
subjects decide to give under the pure unit scheme with a one-week ration at
price of $3.50 as single unit (p < 0.001, χ2-test). If the unit presented to subjects
is instead a one-day nutritional ration at a unit price of $0.50, the propensity
to donate is about 13 percentage points higher than under the pure money
donation scheme (p = 0.026, χ2-test).
Regression results from a linear probability model are presented in Table 5
and confirm these findings.5 In columns 1 and 2, we regress the binary variable
of whether an individual donated on the type of the solicitation scheme, only
considering pure schemes and using the pure money donation scheme as baseline.
A unit donation scheme with a large unit size (a one-week ration at a price of
5Results are robust to using a probit model instead.
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$3.50) is estimated to decrease the propensity to give by about 22 percentage
points compared to a pure money donation scheme, whereas a unit donation
scheme with a small unit size (a one-day ration at a price of $0.50) is estimated to
increase the propensity to give by 11 percentage points when including controls.
Hence, applying a unit donation scheme affects the propensity to give, but the
direction of the effect depends on the unit size.
Why do we find such substantial effects on the extensive margin but no
significant differences in mean donations? As Figure 1 reveals, the large-sized
unit donation scheme decreases the share of individuals who donate but also
encourages individuals to choose a higher donation level than they would have
chosen under a money donation scheme. For example, the mass of individuals
who give more than $1.00 but less than $3.50 under the money donation scheme
seems to entirely shift to the donation level of $3.50. In the case of the small-
sized unit donation scheme, the positive impact on the extensive margin does not
translate into substantially higher mean donations since the increase is mainly
driven by additional small donations of one unit, i.e. $0.50. Beyond donations
of $0.50, the cumulative distribution function looks similar to that of the money
donation treatment.
Due to the inclusion of the intermediate treatments, we are able to attribute
differences in the propensity to give between the pure money and the large-sized
unit donation scheme to a particular characteristic. Analogously to the proce-
dure in Section 4.1, we regress the binary variable of whether a subject donated
on a dummy for each of the three characteristics. The estimation results are
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. Neither the unit frame nor the infor-
mation on the effectiveness of a donation significantly affects the propensity to
give. By contrast, restricting the choice set significantly reduces the propensity
to give by about 15 percentage points. In columns 5 and 6, we additionally allow
for an interaction between the restriction of the choice set and the framing in
16
Table 5: Effect on the propensity to give (linear probability model)
Pure schemes Pure and intermediate schemes
with large unit size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unit Donation – Large -0.217*** -0.219*** – – – –
(0.057) (0.057)
Unit Donation – Small 0.129** 0.113** – – – –
(0.057) (0.057)
Price information – – -0.050 -0.050 -0.040 -0.041
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058)
Unit frame – – -0.033 -0.027 -0.055 -0.047
(0.040) (0.041) (0.059) (0.059)
Restricted choice set – – -0.146*** -0.157*** -0.166*** -0.177***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.056)
Unit frame × restricted – – – – 0.044 0.043
(0.080) (0.081)
Controlsa No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 419 408 701 686 701 686
R2 0.077 0.109 0.032 0.045 0.033 0.046
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent variable is
whether a subject has donated and the pure money donation scheme always serves as baseline. In columns 1
and 2, only the treatements with pure solicitation schemes are considered. In columns 3 to 6, all treatments
except the unit donation scheme with a small unit size are considered.
aControls include gender, age, whether the individual has a college degree, whether the individual has
children and whether online crowdworking is the individual’s primary source of income.
units. The impact of restricting choices is slightly but not significantly smaller
in absolute terms if a unit frame is already in place (p = 0.59). These results
are robust to controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and are consistent
with pairwise comparisons.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Donation schemes can be designed in terms of physical units to fund rather
than the amount of money to give. Does this design of the ask affect in-
dividuals’ giving behavior? The popularity of unit donation schemes among
fundraisers suggests that it should, and that the scheme’s performance justifies
the complications of the design, such as additional information provision and
the reduced freedom in how the funds can be used. To address this research
question, we conducted an online experiment in which we tested different so-
licitation schemes. While we do not find evidence that unit donation schemes
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affect the amount of money raised, we show that they alter the propensity to
give. The direction of this effect depends on the unit size of the charitable good.
If the unit size is small, a unit donation scheme attracts more donors than a
competing money donation scheme. If the unit size is large, unit donations can
deter donors. A unit donation scheme with a small unit size can therefore be
an effective strategy for a charity to expand its donor base.
An interesting question is why the effect on the extensive margin reverses
when the unit size becomes small. The negative impact of larger-sized units
on the extensive margin of giving, relative to the money donation scheme, is
unsurprising. In fact, from the intermediate treatments, we can pinpoint that
it is the restriction of the choice set that is mostly responsible for the drop
in donors. Since the price of becoming a donor increases from almost zero
($0.01) in a virtually continuous choice set to $3.50 in a restricted choice set,
this demand side response is expected. However, the same logic would apply
to the smaller-sized unit. There, the price of becoming a donor increases from
almost zero ($0.01) in a virtually continuous choice set to $0.50 (the price of a
one-day nutritional ration). As a result, we would expect the magnitude of the
effect at the extensive margin to be smaller, but the predicted direction would
be the same.
While we do not have intermediate treatments for the small unit size that
would allow us to disentangle the exact characteristic responsible for that in-
crease, a closer look at the distributions of the donations under the pure solicita-
tion schemes (see Figure 1) offers a plausible explanation. As observed earlier,
the distribution of donation amounts under the money donation scheme has
focal points at $0, $1.00, and $2.00. This suggests that a substantial share of
subjects behaves as if the range of donations available is restricted to integers of
dollar amounts. In such a world, the minimum donation, and hence the perceived
price of becoming a donor, is $1.00. Offering to fund a charitable good with
18
a price below the smallest focal point of the unrestricted distribution of giving
reduces the perceived price of becoming a donor, resulting in a higher propen-
sity to give. Another possible explanation is that the small unit size acts like
a low suggested donation amount. Edwards and List (2014) show that suggest-
ing an amount that is below the average donation can increase the propensity
to give. Finally, in a world in which “penny donations” carry a stigma or are
considered unproductive, a smaller-sized unit justifies small donation amounts.
These explanations are in line with the observation that the positive effect on
the extensive margin is mainly driven by additional small donations of $0.5 (as
discussed in Section 4.2).
Our results from the intermediate treatments (for the large unit size) offer
interesting insights into the relevance of framing, choice restrictions, and in-
formation provision. First, simply rephrasing the ask from giving money to
funding units does not affect giving behavior. Second, we show that restrictions
of the choice set can have large behavioral consequences that should be taken
into account when designing experiments or fundraising campaigns. This evi-
dence is in line with the finding that a minimum donation amount reduces the
propensity to give in the absence of extrinsic incentives to give (Cartwright and
Mirza, 2019). It also matches well with the result that large suggested donation
amounts discourage giving (Adena et al., 2014). Finally, providing explicit in-
formation about the per unit price of the charitable good did not significantly
affect the propensity to give or overall donations in our experiment. Previous
experiments have used different formats when providing information about the
effectiveness of a donation and either did not find an impact on the aggregate
(Karlan and Wood, 2017) or identified a significant increase in donations (La-
tour and Manrai, 1989; Cryder et al., 2013).
An interesting avenue for future research is to explore the role of the unit
size in more detail. While we show that the unit size matters for the impact
19
of applying a unit donation scheme, it is unclear whether the effect on the
extensive margin monotonically increases with the unit size. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to know at which point the effect reverses and to which
extent it depends on the distribution of donations under unrestricted choices.
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A.1 Wording of donation appeal
Part I:
As part of this survey, each participant will have the opportunity to sup-
port the provision of nutritious food for malnourished children in the
African country of South Sudan.
[Picture of malnourished child]
Decades of civil war have devastated South Sudan and many children are
severely malnourished. The rations of the nutritious food are supplied by
Sign of Hope, an accredited relief organization from Germany cooperating with
a hospital in South Sudan.
Sign of Hope holds the certificate for responsible and transparent use
of collected donations (”Spendenzertifikat”) awarded by the ”Deutscher
Spendenrat”, a German umbrella association for charitable organizations. 86
cents of every dollar they receive go directly into the relief efforts, while the
remaining fourteen cents cover their overheads. Learn more about the organi-
zation at http://www.sign-ofhope.org.
[Picture of malnourished child]
Part II – Money Donation:
The nutritious food consists of a specially developed paste and energy-rich
biscuits that help children gain weight.
In this survey, you may donate all, part, or none of your reward of $7.00
for this MTurk HIT to Sign of Hope for providing the nutritious food.
Thus, you may choose any amount from $0 to $7.00. The amount you
choose will be subtracted from your reward.
Please indicate how much money you wish to donate below:
[Numeric field to indicate dollar amount]
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Part II – Unit Donation – Large:
One nutritional ration, which feeds one malnourished child for one
week, can be provided by the charity for a donation of $3.50. The
nutritious food consists of a specially developed paste and energy-rich
biscuits that help children gain weight.
In this survey, you may use all, part, or none of your reward of $7.00
for this MTurk HIT to provide these nutritional rations. Thus, you may
choose a number from 0 to 2 rations. $3.50 per ration will be sub-
tracted from your reward.
Please indicate how many rations you wish to provide below:
[Numeric field to indicate number of rations, restricted to 0, 1, and 2]
Part II – Unit Donation – Small:
One nutritional ration, which feeds one malnourished child for one
day, can be provided by the charity for a donation of $0.50. The nutri-
tious food consists of a specially developed paste and energy-rich biscuits
that help children gain weight.
In this survey, you may use all, part, or none of your reward of $7.00
for this MTurk HIT to provide these nutritional rations. Thus, you may
choose a number from 0 to 14 rations. $0.50 per ration will be sub-
tracted from your reward.
Please indicate how many rations you wish to provide below:
[Numeric field to indicate number of rations, restricted to integers between 0
and 14]
Part II – Info:
One nutritional ration, which feeds one malnourished child for one
week, can be provided by the charity for a donation of $3.50. The
nutritious food consists of a specially developed paste and energy-rich
biscuits that help children gain weight.
In this survey, you may donate all, part, or none of your reward of $7.00
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for this MTurk HIT to Sign of Hope for providing the nutritious food.
Thus, you may choose any amount from $0 to $7.00. The amount you
choose will be subtracted from your reward.
Please indicate how much money you wish to donate below:
[Numeric field to indicate dollar amount]
Part II – Info + Frame:
One nutritional ration, which feeds one malnourished child for one
week, can be provided by the charity for a donation of $3.50. The
nutritious food consists of a specially developed paste and energy-rich
biscuits that help children gain weight.
In this survey, you may use all, part, or none of your reward of $7.00 for
this MTurk HIT to provide these nutritional rations. Thus, you may
choose any number from 0 to 2 rations (including fractions). $3.50
per ration (or the appropriate fraction) will be subtracted from your
reward.
Please indicate how many rations you wish to provide below:
[Numeric field to indicate number of rations]
Part II – Info + Restricted:
One nutritional ration, which feeds one malnourished child for one
week, can be provided by the charity for a donation of $3.50. The
nutritious food consists of a specially developed paste and energy-rich
biscuits that help children gain weight.
In this survey, you may donate all, part, or none of your reward of $7.00
for this MTurk HIT to Sign of Hope for providing the nutritious food.
In particular, you may choose an amount of $0, $3.50, or $7.00. The
amount you choose will be subtracted from your reward.
Please indicate how much money you wish to donate below:
[Numeric field to indicate dollar amount, restricted to $0, $3.50, and $7.00]
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics by treatment
Age Has College Crowd-
Treatment Female (years) children graduate worker N
A. Pure schemes
Money Donation 0.52 37.20 0.47 0.49 0.25 152
(0.50) (10.64) (0.50) (0.50) (0.43)
Unit Donation – Large (p = $3.50) 0.52 37.34 0.50 0.53 0.23 121
(0.50) (10.30) (0.50) (0.50) (0.42)
Unit Donation – Small (p = $0.50) 0.60 37.42 0.48 0.48 0.23 146
(0.49) (10.20) (0.50) (0.50) (0.42)
B. Intermediate schemes
Info (p = $3.50) 0.52 36.71 0.46 0.53 0.28 150
(0.50) (10.68) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45)
Info + Unit frame (p = $3.50) 0.54 36.33 0.43 0.48 0.19 132
(0.50) (10.40) (0.50) (0.50) (0.39)
Info + Restricted (p = $3.50) 0.55 37.65 0.45 0.44 0.31 146
(0.50) (11.34) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47)
F -test (p-value) 0.75 0.91 0.93 0.71 0.25
Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of observations per variable does not always correspond
to the number of subjects in the treatment group since we did not force subjects to answer the survey
questions. The last row shows the p-value of the F -test for the joint significance of the treatment dummies
when regressing the respective variable on the treatment dummies and a constant.
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